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1. The Authors 
This book, valuable but intennittently irritating, appears 
to have been written by two distinct Bernard E. Rollin 
personalities. One of them is Bernard E. Rollin the 
meliorist philosopher. DER-MP (as I shall henceforth 
refer to him) became well known with Animal Rights 
and Human Morality (fIrSt edition 1981, second edition 
1992). He is a meliorist rather than an abolitionist 
inasmuch as he believes that significant animal use. 
especially for food, is here to stay and need not be 
morally objectionable. He holds. however, that very 
much existing animal use fails to meet minimal moral 
standards. Ibe lot of animals in human hands must be 
significantly ameliorated. Distinctive of the ethical 
analysis of BER-MP is the notion of an animal's telos, 
the complex ofdesires and behaviors or more generally 
of ways of being, of acting, and of relating to one's 
conspecifics, that are natural for a member of the 
species. To prevent an animal from living in accordance 
with its tetos is to deprive it of a minimally decem life. 
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So BER-MP's focus is not on welfare or suffering 
(though of course preventing natural behavior causes 
frustration, and pain and terror inhibit relic behavior). 
Neither is it on a general notion of inherent value or of 
rights to equal consideration. Animals must not be 
abused, and especially must not suffer the profound 
frustration ofbeing prevented from realizing their teloi. 
But there is no necessary incompatibility, BER-MP 
holds, between respecting an animal's telos and raising 
it for slaughter. 
The second author is Bernard E. Rollin the 
agribusiness tactician. I'll call him BER-AT. This 
personality doesn't seem to be a philosopher at all. He 
speaks the language of prudence, not that of duty. He 
has no views whatever about animal welfare. He's 
responsible for the 'social' in the book's subtitle. 
Consumers and voters, increasingly, are concerned 
about farm animal welfare as they perceive it. (Are they 
right? Are they wrong? BER-AT doesn't care-it's not 
his job.) DER-AT's job is to advise agribusiness about 
this threat to current and future profits. Worried about 
flooding? Build a levee and buy insurance. Worried 
about animal welfare concerns? Change some practices 
and fund some research. 
I've known BER-MP slightly, and his works 
extensively, for many years, and thought well of both. 
BER-AT, however, is new, at least to me and at least in 
the strength he has here. 
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2 - The Structure of the Book 
The ba~ic structure and overall aims of the book appear 
to have been determined by DER-AT. The intended 
audience is clearly practitioners of production animal 
agriculture in all its stages, especially producer's 
associations and any other entities capable of funding 
research, and the supporting clements of the agribusiness­
government complex (the U.S. Department of Agri­
culture, state agencies, the land-grant universities, etc.). 
Part 1 consists of two chapters, one describing the 
threat, the "New Social Ethic for Animals," and one 
describing the ways in which scientific research on 
animal welfare can provide defenses against the threat. 
Part 2 consists of five chapters on specific forms 
of animal agriculture, welfare issues for each, and 
suggestions for lines of research. There are chapters 
on beef, swine, dairy, veal, and poultry. (There is no 
chapter on sheep, and the poultry chapter is concerned 
only with chickens.) 
There is a brief final chapter of reflections on 
production agriculture in general. 
BER-AT sets the agenda, but the voice of BER-MP 
is heard again and again, least clearly in the first and 
third chapters, most clearly in the sixth (veal) and last. 
3 • The "New Social Ethk" 
In the good old days, BER-AT tells us, traditional 
agricultural practices prevented, as a rule, the abuse of 
animals in agriculture. Good husbandry was good 
business and the producer's interests and those of the 
animals pretty well coincided. 
Society, therefore, did not need laws man­

dating good husbandry for animals-that was
 
dictated by self-interest and reinforced by the
 
ancient ethic of care. If a person did not care
 
about self-interest, he or she was unlikely to
 
be persuaded by laws.... This, in tum, explains
 
why the traditional social consensus ethic for
 
the treatment of animals-the anticruelty
 
ethic ... could be so minimal and yet socially
 
adequate. (p. 7)
 
This romantic picture of traditional agriculture is hard 
to take very seriously. It is, in fact, undermined and 
sometimes just contradicted repeatedly in this very book 
hy what I take to he insertions by BER-MP. One of 
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them, on rodeo, shows up later in the very paragraph 
from which I have just quoted. 
Real or imaginary (or, more likely, a bit of each), 
traditional practices of good husbandry, telos­
respecting if not always benevolent, no longer govern 
agricultural practice. In some areas (cattle on range), 
they have been undermined. In others (chickens, veal 
calves), they have just been extirpated. Modem animal 
agriculture is capital-intensive, animal-intensive, and 
husbandry-poor (it is not just that there are too few 
workers to attend to the needs of individual animals 
but that the mindset and wage structure of intensive 
agriculture actively discourage such attention). 
Further, much modem animal agriculture is confine­
ment agriculture, and confinement invariably frustrates 
drives central to the teloi of the animals confined. 
Things have changed for the animals, and changed 
much for the worse. 
Human society has changed as well. We have moved 
from the farms into the city, losing direct contact with 
agriculture. The mass media have exploited our 
fascination with animals. To these two points by BER­
AT, BER-MPadds that society has been progressively 
opening itself to concern for hitherto neglected or 
excluded groups, with nonhuman animals a natural next 
step in the expansion. Pro-animal arguments by 
philosophers (including, of course, DER-MP himself) 
have rcached a wider and wider audience. 
The result is a "new social ethic for animals." A 
large majority of Americans are concerned about the 
treatment of animals. A remarkable number arc willing 
to ascribe rights of some sort to nonhuman animals. 
But an even larger majority ofAmericans believes that 
it is permissible for us to consume animals as food. 
BER-AT takes this 'ethic' as his point of reference. We 
will continue to raise and consume animals, but the 
welfare of the animals must be improved (and most 
important, must be perceived as improved), even if the 
result is increased costs. 
Is the "new social ethic" coherent? Can we really 
believe both that animals have some son ofmoral claim 
to concern (never mind the philosophical distinctions 
between rights, welfare, and so on) and that it is 
permissible raise and kill them (or even just to 
inconvenience them) simply because we are accustomed 
to certain fonns of fO<Xl? BER-AT, as I have already 
mentioned, is simply not interested in this question. But 
BER-MP is quite interested in questions of coherence, 
and he raises a number of them in this book. 1 Not, 
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however, this big one. The coherence of the "new social 
ethic" is neither challenged nor defended. 
The purpose of the book is to survey problems of 
animal welfare in production agriculture with an eye 
toward removing or reducing those in conflict with 
the "new social ethic." As this is sketched out, one of 
the most striking of the many conflicts between the 
two authorial personalities almost leaps off the page. 
In the last paragraph of p. 23, BER-MP emerges to 
rebut the dismissal of critics of intensive agriculture 
as uninformed. 
Contrary to the beliefs of some elements of
 
the agricultural community, however, it will
 
not help to "educate" the public. In fact, if the
 
pUblic knew more about the way in which
 
agricultural animal production infringes on
 
animal welfare, the outcry would be louder....
 
Plainly, if the public knew... it would be more,
 
not less, hostile to current agriculture. [ellipses
 
mark omission of three examples]
 
In the very next paragraph (fIrst on p. 24), BER-AT is 
back in control an~ ignoring his other half like a split­
brain patient, warns that 
... the agricultural community should develop
 
it,> own legislation before uninformed legis­

lation is thrust on it.
 
"Uninformed legislation"? 
4 - Welfare Research 
Research on animal welfare is central to the solutions 
BER-AT om~rs agribusiness. But is it even possible to 
study welfare scientifically? That is the question 
addressed by the second chapter. Here BER-AT passes 
the baton to BER-MP. The result is a much more 
coherent and much more satisfactory chapter. Four 
beliefs stand in the way of animal welfare research. 
1. The view that animal welfare and animal rights
 
represent a clear-cut dichotomy, separated by an
 
unbridgeable gulf. Animal welfare is perceived as
 
an acceptable concern of producers; animal rights
 
is denied any legitimacy. This opinion is held
 
strongly by producers, agricultural scientists, and
 
veterinarians and is essentially never questioned.
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2. The conviction that one can talk ofanimal welfare 
in a value-free, objective, factual context. Again, 
this view is held by all elements of agriculture 
but is elicited most easily from scientists, who are 
steeped in the belief that science is value-free. 
3. Thc general principle that science and ethics are 
radically separated, with science having no 
connection to ethics. 
4. The notion that research into animal welfare cannot 
address, in any scientific way, issues pertaining 
to animal consciousness or animal feeling, 
including felt pain and suffering. (p. 27) 
Most of Chapter 2 consists of the systematic 
destruction of these four claims, in the order given. It is 
vintage BER-MP. That is, it is fIrst rate. 
5 - The Aff'lrmative Ad Hominem 
The frrst of the chapters on types of animal agriculture 
is on cattle ranching. BER (both AT and MP) is clearly 
fond of, or at least favorably impressed by, many 
ranchers. So much so, in fact, that he slips into a fallacy 
I'm going to call the affrrmative ad hominem. 
It is customary to distinguish two or three varieties 
of the fallacy known as 'ad hominen' (to the person). 
The most common is the abusive ad hominem, of the 
form "So-and-so is a rotten person, and So-and-so 
believes that P is true. Therefore P is false." These 
completely worthless arguments are depressingly 
common. I have on at least three occasions been assured 
that animal research is uniformly morally acceptable 
because the people at PETA are a bunch of degenerates. 
I hereby christen as 'affirmative ad hominem' 
another seriously defective form of argument. The 
form is "A, B, and C are decent people. A, B, and C 
participate in practice X. Therefore practice X is morally 
acceptable." Very little reflection should be required 
to see the fallaciousness of this argument. Most of my 
ancestors were probably decent people, by the light 
of their times. Most people are. Yet many, in fact 
almost all, of my ancestors (yours too, gentle reader) 
supported or acquiesced in systems of slavery, racial 
and sexual oppression, and (pace Rollin) brutal 
treatment of animals. 
In this book, affrrmative ad hominem arguments are 
concentrated in Chapter 3. These more-or-Iess­
traditional cattle ranchers are wonderful folks. Therefore 
the practice of (at least more-or-Iess-traditional) cattle 
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ranching must be quite all right. BER-MP knows, must 
know, that this is a dreadful argument. But affection 
clouds his mind.2 
6· Varieties of Animal Agriculture 
All of the chapters on specific forms of production 
agriculture will be of great value to anyone interested 
in farm animal welfare. The references are extensive 
and illuminating. (Unfortunately, the notes arc at the 
end of the volume rather than at the foot of the page, 
where they belong. Certainly Iowa State press uses 
computer typesetting. There's just no excuse for a major 
press to persist in outmoded and quite inconvenient note 
placement.) Unless you're exceptionally well 
acquainted with all these forms of animal agriculture, 
you will learn much. (Until I read this book, I'd never 
heard of a gomer bull.) 
The tension between BER-AT and BER-MP is 
highest, as I have already indicated, in the Chapter on 
cattle ranching. This chapter contains (a) valuable 
descriptive information, (b) paeans of praise for the 
traditional ranching ethos, and (c) incisive criticism of 
that ethos as morally incoherent. The American tradition 
of cattle ranching involves castration, dehorning, and 
branding, none of which are necessary and all of which 
cause considerable suffering. Less central to the tradition 
is the gratuitous rough treatment ofcattle DER-MP calls 
"eowboying." Cowboying is really a form of enter­
tainment, a gratifying demonstration of macho mastery 
(not limited, alas, to males). Ibe rodeo is to eowboying 
what college or professional basketball is to pickup 
playground basketball. BER-MP points out that many 
people immersed in the ranching tradition are 
uncomfortable about cowboying and, a fortiori, about 
rodeo. But very few show real concern about the more 
central practices ofcastration, branding, and dehorning.3 
The presence of BER-MP increases even further in 
the next chapter, on swine. Ibe discussion of the natural 
behavior (i.e. the telos) of swine is fascinating, and the 
criticism of routine tail docking and other responses to 
the 'vices' created by confinement and overcrowding 
is impressive. (The attack on the vice of 'vice' talk is 
just the sort of thing BER-MP does best.) 
TIle treatments of diary farming and of poultry are 
both quite impressive. I found the criticism ofdebeaking 
exceptionally useful because of the powerful scientific 
evidence BER-MP musters. In both chapters, the telus 
analysis plays a major role. 
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In the sixth chapter, on veal, BER-AT is almost 
entirely absent. Confinement veal raising is portrayed 
as an abomination, rejected not only by the "new social 
ethic" but by cattle ranchers, some of them moved to 
tears by films of calves in crates. 
7· Human Farm Animal Welfare 
In the short and schematic conduding chapter, DER­
AT is back. But in these very general reflections on the 
state of American agriculture, he and BER-MP have 
something important to teach us. There are human 
animals down on the farm, too, and they're not doing 
very well. The transformation of agriculture that put 
chickens in cages and cows in crates also put farmers 
in debt, or at the merey of a merciless market, or just 
out of business. The family farm is effectively extinct, 
replaced by the factory, the multinational corporation, 
and those it has effectively reduced to sharecropper 
status, or the economically marginal operation in which 
every human adult has another full-time job. 
Rollin sketches a dream of a future in which people 
can lead a good life on the farm. Those of us to the 
'left' of him on animal treatment should also have such 
a vision, a vision of more people living beller on less 
land, supplying the rest of us with healthy food, almost 
certainly at higher cost. (There's no free lunch, and no 
free breakfast or dinner, either. The costs that have been 
borne by the nonhuman animals, by the environment, 
and by exploited and displaced farm families, will have 
to be distributed somehow.) Rollin's dream isn't mine 
Ixxause in his, animals arc still being raised for food. 
But it is an answer to the perfectly reasonable question, 
"What happens to the farmers'!" Ibat is a question that 
deserves an answer. 
8 - Meliorists and Abolitionists 
How should an abolitionist (one who believes it morally 
obligatory to abandon the consumption ofanimals) react 
to this book, or for that matter, to meliorist proposals 
of any sort? Purists of a certain sort will simply 
denounce them as compromises with evil. Purists of 
another sort might eondemn them on the grounds that, 
if the lot of farm animals really were to be substantially 
ameliorated, the momentum of the movement for 
complete liberation would be substantially reduced. 
Abolitionists of this sort would prefer for the chickens 
to remain in the cages, debeaked, perhaps even for the 
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calves to remain in the crates, in order to 'radicalize' 
ordinary citizens by confronting them with these 
horrors. Tactically, then, sucb an abolitionist should 
loudly praise this book in order to taint it in the eyes of 
the agribusiness establishment. 
I confess that I'm not mucb of a purist here, but I 
don't know wbether that is because I think mass 
transformation by radicalization is wildly unlikely in 
this case, or because I'm just a weak-willed compro­
miser. Adoption of the sorts of reforms championed in 
this book would relieve vast animal suffering and 
frustration. Very many animals would be much better 
off. That is, I believe, a very good reason to hope that 
BER-MP and even BER-AT get the ear of the 
establishment Further, if these became the standard 
positions of agribusiness, the center of gravity of the 
debate would have shifted a long way in 'our' direction. 
(Tactically, that might mean that we should denounce 
this book as violently and luridly as possible as a 
compendium of sadism, thus drawing the other side to 
its defense. So suppress this review.) 
Read this book. 
Notes 
1See, for example, the critique of some research practices 
on Kantian grounds on p. 47. 
2 So much so, in fact, that he complains of "cheap shols" 
at the nuble ranchers (p. 57), and fires uffhis own cheap shots 
at unnamed strawpersons ("producing meat protein in 
fermentation vats") (p.52). 
3 "Cowboying" is depressingly common all over the 
country, not just in Rollin's West. On two occasions, 
agricnltural ,cientists have expressed concern about it to me. 
lt should be noted that they knew they were talking to an 
abolitionist. Intellectual honesty outweighed political 
prudence. There are many decent people involved in 
production animal agriculture. 
Response: 
Seeing Double 
Bernard E. Rollin 
Colorado State University 
Since a great many people arc extremely uncomfortable 
in a world containing only one Bernard Rollin, Harlan 
Miller's suggestion of two Rollins is certainly 
unacceptable in the better world we all hope to build. 
In what follows, I will do my best to unify the disparate 
Rollins that he fmds speaking in my Farm Animal Welfare. 
Professor Miller is absolutely correct in bis 
assumption that the primary audience for the book is 
the people who are in fact responsible for contemporary 
agriculture in the United States-producers, USDA, and 
agricultural scientists. It was, in fact, USDA that 
contracted with me for the study that resulted in this 
book. Specifically, I was asked to explain to USDA in 
particular, and to the powerful agricultural community 
in general. why they should care about, attend to, or 
spend any money to improve, farm animal welfare. After 
all, these are people who tend to believe 
I. that science is ethics-frcc 
2. that the goal	 of agriculture is efficiency and 
productivity 
3. that if there is any sense to the notion of ethics 
underlying agricultural practice, it is the moral 
imperative to produce cheap and plentiful food, 
and lastly, therefore 
4. that animal agriculture is fine the way it is and 
should be altered only to create greater efficiency 
and productivity. 
Among the few who have reflccted on the notion of 
animal welfare, it is dogma that 
DISCUSSION 
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5.	 if animal agriculture is productive, the animals 
must be well-off. 
And these people further put their money where their 
mouth is-4)f the some 600 million dollars comprising 
the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) of USDA's 
budget, and of the 400 million dollars making up the 
budget of the Cooperative State Research Service 
(CSRS) of USDA, not one cent was spent on welfare 
research at the time I undertook this project. 
Throughout my 20-year career in animal ethics, most 
of my work has been aimed at changing the behavior 
and eventually the thinking of animal users who do not, 
at least initially, reflect upon the animals they use except 
as means to an end. I began working with veterinary 
educators, and was able to change the horrendous 
practice of teaching surgery through doing multiple 
survival surgeries on animals (over 20 such surgeries 
on a dog was the rule in some institutions). I (and three 
colleagues in Colorado) articulaled the concept behind 
the 1985 federal laws mandating the control of pain 
and suffering in research animals, and 1testified before 
Congress on its behalf, carrying the support of 
significant elements of the research community. I was 
able to galvanize significant numbers of cattlemen to 
oppose the USDA practice of hot iron face-branding 
and spaying without anesthesia of Mexican eattlc 
entering the U.S. under NAFfA. I was able to get the 
two senior researchers at the Colorado Division of 
Wildlife (hardly a group of radicals) to wrile a strong 
letter for PETA opposing the Nature Conservancy's 
snaring of feral pigs in Hawaii, and so on. 
I did not accomplish these and other advances 
merely by presenting well-articulated moral arguments, 
though such arguments certainly influenced some 
animal users. After all, people simply blow-off many 
arguments they cannot refute, especially when a 
strongly entrenched ideology tells them that their 
activities are "value-free" and, aforriori, "ethics-free." 
There is, in fact, as Plato pointed out, only one way 
of successfully changing people's moral positions-that 
is by "recollection"-showing them that what you wish 
to convince them of ethically is a logical consequence 
of what they already believe but have not thought 
lhrough properly. (Hence, Socrales' notion of a moral 
philosopher being a "midwife.") One may be able to 
teach empirical material, such as the state capitals; in 
ethics, one can only "remind." TIlis is exactly what I 
did with velerinarians; I showed them that their behavior 
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in animal use was severely at odds with the notion that 
animals are worthy of moral concern, a notion that 
brought most of them into veterinary medicine in the 
first place! In the ensuing years, veterinary colleges have 
moved to embrace, rather than eschew, many animal 
welfare concerns. This is also the tack I have employed 
successfully with Western ranchers, who are steeped in 
the ethic of husbandry that Dr. Miller somewhat 
cavalierly dismisses. The result can be seen in a 
remarkable pair of editorials about my work in The 
Western Livestock Journal (May 15 and May 22, 1995), 
reiterating rancher commitment to respecting animals' 
nature and attacking industrialized, confinement 
agriculture as morally unacceptable. 
But what of those who are insulated from recol­
lection of their own ethics by an ideology that says 
their activities are value-free? Here I borrow a notion 
from Hegel, namely that at least part of a philosopher's 
job is bringing to articulated awareness current 
movements in social thought. If the reconstruction is 
correct, people will agree with one's articulation; ifnot, 
you will be ignored. 
It is ea~y to convince even those who prima facie 
deny the relevance ofethics to science (1) that in society 
there exists a consensus social ethic reflecting what 
society believes is right and wrong and (2) that this ethic 
in fact determines our laws and social policies. Purther, 
it is easy to show sub-groups of society, i.e., those in 
professions such as medicine, law, veterinary medicine, 
agriculture, research, etc., that even though their 
professional status grants them certain privileges and 
autonomy, society expects them to behave in accord 
with the social ethic, i.e., to regulate themselves the 
way society would tell them to behave if society 
understood enough about the profession to regulate it! 
Failure to so accord leads to loss of autonomy; vide the 
laws regulating animal research that passed when 
society realized that animal researchers were not 
behaving in harmony with social expectations. 
It is for this reason that, in this book, I remind 
agriculturalists amI agricultural scientists that society 
is growing increasingly concerned about animal 
treatlIlen~ and also of what fonn that concen! is taking. 
(I believe, in fact, thatit is moving towards the ethic I 
outlined in my Animal Rights and Human Morality.) I 
do not see why Dr. Miller does not applaud this ploy, 
as it at least get~ this population that ha~ ignored animal 
welfare to consider the issues in a positive way. Nor do 
I understalld his derisive comment, "Worried about 
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flooding? Build a levcc and buy insurance. Worried 
about animal welfare concerns? Change some practices 
and fund some research." Isn't changing the practices 
of confinement agriculture exactly what those 
concerned about animal treatment ought to be after? 
And isn't research the only way to effect change in 
agricultural practices that have been entrenched for 50 
years and are highly successful economically? Even the 
most complete but rational abolitionist should, in the 
world we must deal with, applaud incremental change 
that benefits the animals. 
Nor do I see why Dr. Miller is so cynical about 
pre-industrialized, husbandry-based agriculture. While 
such agriculture was certain!y not perfect from the point 
ofview of the animal, at least it had to respect the animals' 
needs and natures to work, something industrialized, 
high-tech conrrnement agriculture does not need to do! 
Peter Singer and Jim Mason, Ruth Harrison, and the 
Swedish public which moved to abolish industrialized 
agriculture have all made similar point~. 
The bottom line is that my approach works to make 
things better for animals. On the strength of my report, 
USDA specifically included (and funded) animal 
welfare projccts for thc first timc in its competitivc 
grants program. It has also held major confcrcnccs on 
"farm animal well-being." I was able to address 150 
USDA leaders on the wrongncss of the face-branding, 
and garner their complete agreement. They are 
considering making me an "ombudsman" for animals. 
By the same token, the Colorado Cattlemen opposed 
the face branding of Mexican cattle, despite the fact 
that the National Cattlemen's Association supported the 
practice--surely a courageous and moral act. They have 
further spearheaded the U.S.'s strongest bill on "downer 
cattle," currently passing through the Colorado 
Legislature and something I helped to catalyze. 
There are many very able people who eloquently 
advocate for animals and help sharpen the thinking of 
those already concerned about animal treatment--Peter 
Singer, Steve Sapontzis, Tom Regan, Evelyn Pluhar, 
Oale Jameson, Stephen Clark, Gary Comstock, and 
Harlan Miller are notable examples. There are very few 
people who work directly with those who use animals 
and those who initially scoff at or flatly reject both moral 
criticism and talk about animal welfare or animal right~. 
Someone needs to get them to recollect the moral 
legitimacy of issues of animal treatment. That is my 
job, and most people in the animal movement see the 
need for someone operating on that front, although few 
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wish to do so themselves. I would like to continue to 
do that job without constantly being accused, directly 
or indirectly, of "selling out." 
I have a great respect for Harlan Miller, for his strong 
dedication to animals and for his work. And I am also 
grateful to him for his careful review, which is 
thoughtful, fair-minded and very sensitive to the points 
I have tried to make. I hope only to convince him that, 
in finding two Rollins, he may be staring too closely at 
the page and thereby seeing double. Ifhe moves a little 
further away, perhaps he will again see one. 
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unsympathetic, sometimes hostile. BER-AT, as I read 
him, sees the new social ethic as an unfortunate reality Reply: 
with which agribusiness must deal (hence tile flooding 
Still Squinting analogy) not as a positive transfonnation. 
Maybe I'm being paranoid. Maybe I'm squinting 
too closely at the text. Read the book to find out. But 
read the book. Harlan B. Miller 
Virginia Tech 
I'm afraid this isn't a very entertaining literary 
controversy. Prof. Rollin replies gently to my criticisms, 
and I'm unable to find any grounds on which to 
denounce him. 
Our differences are two. One is deep and complex. 
He's a meliorist and I'm an abolitionist. That's not the 
focus of this exchange. TIle second difference, of much 
less inherent importance, is whether one Rollin or two 
wrote FannAnil1U11 Welfare. 
Prof. Rollin usefully contrasts Socratic and Ilegelian 
approaches to moral reform. The Socratic relies on 
'reminding' , on drawing out the consequences of what 
is already believed. The personality I called BER-MP 
proceeds Socratically, arguing that much contemporary 
treatment of nonhuman animals is unacceptable on 
principles already accepted by everyone but a few neo-
Cartesian philosophers. (Many other writers also 
proceed in tIlis way, of course.) 
The personality I called BER-AT, on tile other hand, 
proceeds in tile Hegelian mode, "bringing to articulated 
awareness current movements in social thought." This 
mode is especially useful in freeing those protected from 
the Socratic approach by the armor of ideology. 
Prof. Rollin denies that BER-MP and BER-AT are 
different actors. There's just one Bemard E. Rollin, 
operating in bolll Socratic and Hegelian modes. I'm still 
unconvinced, because in tlle passages I identify with 
BER-AT it seems to me that the relevant "current 
movement in social thought" is not being brought to 
awareness from the inside, hut descrihed from the 
outside. And that description often seems to me quite 
DISCUSSION 
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